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      I  would  like  to  o er  an  interpretation  of  the  Genealogy  of  Morals,   of  the  relationship 
of  master  morality  to  slave  morality,  and  of  Nietzsche's  philosophy  of  history  that  is 
di erent  from  the  interpretation  that  is  normally  o ered  by  Nietzsche  scholars.   Contrary 
to  Nehamas,  Deleuze,  Danto,  and  many  others,  I  wish  to  argue  that  Nietzsche  does  not 
simply  embrace  master  morality  and  spurn  slave  morality.     I  also  wish  to  reject  the  view, 
1
considered  simply  obvious  by  most  scholars,  that  the  Übermensch   develops  out  of,  or  on 
the  model  of,  the  master,  not  the  slave.     And  to  make  the  case  for  all  of  this,  I  want  to 
2
explore  the  relationship  between  Hegel's  master-slave  dialectic  and  the  con ict  Nietzsche 
sees  between  master  morality  and  slave  morality.   That  Nietzsche  does  not  intend  us  to 
recall  the  famous  master-slave  dialectic  of  Hegel's  Phenomenology   as  we  read  the 
Genealogy  of  Morals,   I   nd  di cult  to  believe.   Yet  very  few  commentators  ever  notice, 
let  alone  explore,  this  connection.   Those  who  do,  like  Deleuze,  Greene,  and  Houlgate, 
think  that  Nietzsche,  in  direct  opposition  to  Hegel,  simply  sides  with  the  master,  not  the 
slave,  and  that  Nietzschean  genealogy  renounces  all  Hegelian  dialectic--or  any  sort  of 
1  A.  Nehamas,  Nietzsche:   Life  as  Literature   (Cambridge,  MA:   Harvard  University 
Press  1985),  206.   G.  Deleuze,  Nietzsche  and  Philosophy,   H.  Tomlinson,  trans.  (New 
York:   Columbia  University  Press  1983),  10.   A.C.  Danto,  Nietzsche  as  Philosopher 
(New  York:   Macmillan  1965),  158-160,  166.   Also  see  O.  Schutte,  Beyond  Nihilism: 
Nietzsche  without  Masks   (Chicago:   University  of  Chicago  Press  1984),  108.   On  the 
other  hand,  Kaufmann  does  not  think  that  Nietzsche  necessarily  identi es  with  the 
master;  W.  Kaufmann,  Nietzsche:   Philosopher,  Psychologist,  Antichrist   (Princeton,  NJ: 
Princeton  University  Press  1968),  3rd  edition,  297.   
2    Schacht  is  an  exception  here;  he  does  not  think  that  the  Übermensch   simply 
grows  out  of  master  morality;  R.  Schacht,  Nietzsche   (London:   Routledge  &  Kegan  Paul 
1983),  466. 
 
Hegelian  developmental  view  of  history.     I  do  not  think  any  of  these  views  are  correct.   I 
3
wish  to  argue  that  Nietzsche  is  very  much  in uenced  by  Hegel  and  that  Nietzschean 
genealogy  and  Hegelian  history  are  intimately  linked  in  the  Genealogy  of  Morals.    Thus  I 
think  that  there  is  a  limit  that  must  be  put  to  the  recent  tendency,  otherwise  most 
insightful  and  illuminating,  to  see  Nietzsche  as  radically  postmodern,  as  totally  breaking 
with  the  19th  century,  and,  certainly,  as  having  little  to  do  with  Hegel. 
 
I 
In  the   rst  essay  of  the  Genealogy  of  Morals,   Nietzsche  holds  (in  direct  contradiction  to 
most  other  modern  theorists)  that  morality  originally  had  nothing  to  do  with  what 
bene ted  others,  with  what  was  non-egoistic  or  non-sel sh,  or  even  with  what  was  useful 
to  others.   It  did  not  even  describe  what  was  done  to  others,   but  simply  who   did  it,  the 
character  of  the  doer--the  good  ones  themselves.   'Good'  originally  meant  noble, 
aristocratic,  powerful,  true,  the  truthful  ones.   We   are  the  good  ones!   It  was  a  concept 
inextricably  connected  with  class--the  upper  and  superior  class,  the  good  people--their 
estimation  and  a rmation  of  themselves.   Master  morality  was  a  triumphant  a rmation 
of  self.  
4
      And  'bad'  meant  the  opposite--the  low,  the  plebeian,  the  base.   This  concept,  too,  was 
established  by  the  aristocrats,  not  the  slaves.   It  was  established  by  those  who  'seized  the 
right  to  create  values  …  [t]he  lordly  right  of  giving  names  …  they  say  "this  is   this  and 
this,"  …  and,  as  it  were,  take  possession  of  it.…  '     The  bad  were  the  others,   the  ones  not 
5
like  us  good  ones.   Etymologically,  Nietzsche  claims,  the  word  'good'  in  all  languages 
originally  meant  noble,  aristocratic,  great,  excellent;  and  'bad'  meant  base,  common, 
plebeian.   
6
3    Deleuze,  10,  156,  195.  Also  M.  Foucault,  'Nietzsche,  Genealogy,  History,'  in 
Language,  Counter-Memory,  Practice,   D.F.  Bouchard,  ed.  (Ithaca,  NY:   Cornell 
University  Press  1977),  151-4.   M.  Greene,  'Hegel's  "Unhappy  Consciousness"  and 
Nietzsche's  "Slave  Morality,"'  in  D.E.  Christensen,  ed.,  Hegel  and  the  Philosophy  of 
Religion   (The  Hague:   Martinus  Nijho   1970),  125-41.   S.  Houlgate,  Hegel,  Nietzsche 
and  the  criticism  of  metaphysics   (Cambridge:   Cambridge  University  Press  1986),  19-20. 
However,  Schacht  thinks  that  Nietzsche  holds  a  revised  view  of  Hegelian  development; 
Schacht,  395.   For  a  good  review  of  the  literature  on  the  relationship  of  Hegel  to 
Nietzsche,  though  for  the  most  part  dealing  with  issues  other  than  those  that  I  will  treat, 
see  D.  Breazeale,  'The  Hegel-Nietzsche  Problem,'  in   Nietzsche-Studien,   M.  Montinari, 
W.  Müller-Lauter,  H.  Wenzel,  eds.  (Berlin:   de  Gruyter  1975),  IV,  146-58. 
4    Whenever  available,  I  have  used  Kaufmann's  translations  of  Nietzsche  and,  for 
the  German,  Nietzsche  Werke:   Kritische  Gesamtausgabe,   G.  Colli  and  M.  Montinari, 
eds.   (Berlin:   de  Gruyter  1967   .).   I  will,  whenever  possible,  cite  both  the  section  and 
the  page  of  Nietzsche's  text  so  that  any  other  editions,  English  or  German,  may  be  used. 
On  the  Genealogy  of  Morals   (hereafter  GM  ),  in  On  the  Genealogy  of  Morals   and  Ecce 
Homo ,   W.  Kaufmann,  ed.  (New  York:   Vintage  1969),   'First  Essay,'  §  2,  pp.  25-6;  §  5,  p. 
29;  §  10,  p.  36. 
5    GM,   'First  Essay,'  §  2,  p.  26. 
6    GM,   'First  Essay,'  §  4,  pp.  27-8. 
 
      Slave  morality  is  the  very  opposite  of  master  morality.   It  is  not  self-a rming.   Slaves 
do  not   rst  look  to  themselves  and  say  we  are  good.   Slave  morality  is  reactive.   It   rst 
looks  to  the  other--the  nasty,  vicious,  brutal  masters.   And  it  says  they  are  evil.   It  is   lled 
with  ressentiment.    Only  secondly  does  it  look  to  itself  and  a rm  weakness,  humility, 
subservience,  not  strength  and  power.   This  is  the  morality  of  priests,  slaves,  subordinates.
 
7
      Nietzsche  thinks  we   nd  master  morality  in  Homer,  in  Rome,  in  the  Renaissance,  and 
for  a  last  brief  moment  in  Napoleon  before  this  morality  disappears  in  the  modern  world. 
It  has  been  defeated  by  slave  morality.   We   nd  slave  morality  among  the  Jews,  in 
Christianity,  in  the  Reformation,  in  the  French  Revolution,  in  democracy,  and  in 
socialism--all  of  which  are  committed  to  the  weak,  the  poor,  and  the  powerless.   
8
      It  is  nearly  impossible,  it  seems  to  me,  to  read  the   rst  essay  of  the  Genealogy  of 
Morals   without  recalling  the  master-slave  dialectic  of  Hegel's  Phenomenology.    There 
we  met  two  desiring  consciousnesses,  each  seeking  the  con rmation  of  their  own 
self-conscious  reality  through  the  recognition--to  the  point  of  total  submission--of  the 
other.   These  two  engage  in  a  life  and  death  struggle.   One  of  them  wins  and  becomes  the 
master.   The  other  loses  and  is  made  a  slave.   The   rst  seems  to  become  a  powerful, 
independent,  autonomous  consciousness,  who  now  imposes  his  will  upon  the  other  and 
satis es  his  desires--he  puts  the  slave  to  work  for  him  and  enjoys  life  in  a  way  that  he 
could  not  before.   The  slave,  on  the  other  hand,  becomes  a  dependent  consciousness,  one 
who  works  and  serves--a  mere  thing  whose  very  reality  is  de ned  by  the  master  and  for 
the  master.  
9
      But  then  there  occurs  the  profound  reversal  that  makes  the  master-slave  dialectic  so 
classic.   The  master,  we  begin  to  see,  is  not  really  independent.   He  is  quite  dependent. 
He  depends  upon  the  slave  not  only  for  work  and  the  satisfaction  of  his  desires,  but  for 
recognition  as  well.     What  kind  of  self-con rmation  can  be  gained  from  the  recognition 
10
of  a  slave--a  nobody,  an  object,  a  thing?   On  the  other  hand,  for  his  part,  the  slave, 
through  fear  and  work  begins  to  overcome  his  thing-like  dependence.   Daily  fear  for  his 
life  before  the  master  forces  the  slave  to  become  self-referent,  self-conscious ,  aware  of  his 
own  self-importance,  and  to  do  so  in  a  way  that  deepens  and  interiorizes  the  slave  far 
more  than  occurs  for  the  master.   And  through  work  the  slave  transcends  his  dependence 
and  develops  the  power  to  accomplish  something  of  value.   Work  requires  that  desire  be 
delayed  and  disciplined  in  order  to  develop  the  ability  to  control  nature  and  to  create  an 
object  that  can  meaningfully  satisfy  human  needs  and  desires.    
11
      Thus,  the  demands  of  the  master,  which  begin  as  an  external  and  repressive  force,  are 
internalized  by  the  slave;  they  become  a  discipline  which  deepens  and  spiritualizes  the 
slave;  they  push  him  to  work  and  allow  him  to  create  something  of  signi cance.   This 
7    GM,   'First  Essay,'  §  10,  pp.  36-7. 
8    GM,   'First  Essay,'  §  16,  pp.  53-4. 
9    Phenomenology  of  Spirit,   A.V.  Miller,  trans.  (Oxford:   Clarendon  Press  1977), 
114-16;   for  the  German  see  Phänomenologie  des  Geistes,   J.  Ho meister,  ed.  (Hamburg: 
Felix  Meiner  1952),  144-6. 
10    Phenomenology,   116-7  and  Phänomenologie,   147-8. 
11    Phenomenology ,   118-9  and  Phänomenologie,   148-50. 
 
very  same  model  can  be  found  at  all  levels  of  Hegel's  thought,  and  ultimately  it  explains 
the  construction  of  our  whole  reality.   Kojève  has  argued  that  all  change,  progress,  and 
development  occur  on  the  part  of  the  slave,  not  the  master.     At  any  rate,  we  must  see 
12
that  historical  development,  for  Hegel,  very  much  follows  the  model  of  the  slave.   In  the 
Philosophy  of  History,   Hegel  writes:   'The  two  iron  rods  which  were  the  instruments  of 
this  discipline  were  the  Church  and  serfdom.   The  Church  drove  the  "Heart"  to 
desperation--made  Spirit  pass  through  the  severest  bondage.…  In  the  same  way  serfdom, 
which  made  a  man's  body  not  his  own,  but  the  property  of  another,  dragged  humanity 
through  all  the  barbarism  of  slavery.…  It  was  not  so  much  from   slavery  as  through 
slavery  that  humanity  was  emancipated.…  it  is  from  this  intemperate  and  ungovernable 
state  of  volition  that  the  discipline  in  question  emancipated  him.'    
13
       In  the  Philosophy  of  Right,   Hegel  puts  it  in  more  general  terms:   'Mind  attains  its 
actuality  only  by  creating  a  dualism  within  itself,  by  submitting  itself  to  physical  needs 
and  the  chain  of  these  external  necessities,  and  so  imposing  on  itself  this  barrier  and  this 
 nitude,  and   nally  by  maturing  ( bildet   )  itself  inwardly  even  when  under  this  barrier 
until  it  overcomes  it  and  attains  its  objective  reality  in  the   nite.'     History  is  a  process 
14
that  involves  external  repression,  which  is  accepted  as  a  discipline,  which  is  internalized 
and  sublimated,  which  produces  greater  spiritual  depth,  and  which  allows  one  to  create  by 
transforming  the  world  and  oneself.   In  the  Phenomenology,   for  Hegel,  consciousness, 
which  begins  simply  as  a  desiring  consciousness,  quickly  becomes  an  ascetic, 
self-denying  consciousness,  and  in  the  sphere  of  religion,  at  the  stage  which  Hegel  calls 
'Unhappy  Consciousness,'  projects  from  itself,  imaginatively  creates,  all  reality,  though  it 
takes  this  reality  to  be  an  other,  a  beyond,  an  ideal,  not  itself  or  its  own  doing.   
15
      At  any  rate,  while  Hegel  and  Nietzsche  agree  that  slaves  in  fact  have  won  out  over 
masters,  nevertheless,  Nietzsche  seems  to  reject  with  contempt  the  Hegelian  slave  and 
Hegelian  history,  certainly  as  having  anything  to  do  with  the  emergence  of  the 
Übermensch.    Instead,  Nietzsche  seems  to  side  with  the  master  and  with  genealogy  as 
opposed  to  history. 
      For  Nietzsche,  the  past  is  understood  as  the  result  of  a  meaning,  a  direction,  an 
interpretation  imposed  upon  things  by  those  with  the  power  to  do  so--by  those  with  the 
'lordly  right  of  giving  names  …  they  say  "this  is   this  and  this,"  they  seal  every  thing  and 
event  with  a  sound  and,  as  it  were,  take  possession  of  it.'     Whatever  exists:  
16
 
12    A.  Kojève,  Introduction  to  the  Reading  of  Hegel,   A.  Bloom,  ed.  (New  York: 
Basic  Books  1966),  22,  51. 
13    Philosophy  of  History,   J.  Sibree,  ed.  (New  York:   Dover  1956),  407  and,  for  the 
German,  see  Vorlesungen  über  die  Philosophie  der  Weltgeschichte,   G.  Lasson,  ed. 
(Hamburg:   Felix  Meiner  1968),  II-IV,  875. 
14    Philosophy  of  Right,   T.M.  Knox,  trans.  (Oxford:   Clarendon  Press  1952),  125 
and,  for  the  German,  see  Grundlinien  der  Philosophie  des  Rechts,   J.  Ho meister,  ed. 
(Hamburg:   Felix  Meiner  1955),  168. 
15    Phenomenology,   138  and  Phänomenologie,   170-1.   Also  Greene,  137. 
16    GM,   'First  Essay,'  §  2,  p.  26. 
 
is  again  and  again  reinterpreted  to  new  ends,  taken  over,  transformed,  and 
redirected  by  some  power  superior  to  it;  all  events  in  the  organic  world  are  a 
subduing,  a  becoming  master,   and  all  subduing  and  becoming  master  involves  a 
fresh  interpretation,  an  adaptation  through  which  any  previous  'meaning'  and 
'purpose'  are  necessarily  obscured  or  even  obliterated.…  purposes  and  utilities  are 
only  signs   that  a  will  to  power  has  become  master  of  something  less  powerful  and 
imposed  upon  it  the  character  of  a  function;  and  the  entire  history  of  a  'thing,'  an 
organ,  a  custom  can  in  this  way  be  a  continuous  sign-chain  of  ever  new 
interpretations  and  adaptations  whose  causes  do  not  even  have  to  be  related  to  one 
another  …   
17
 
The  best  example  of  this  can  be  found  in  the  second  essay  of  the  Genealogy  of  Morals 
where  Nietzsche  explores  the  meaning  of  punishment.   He  says,  'the  concept 
"punishment"  possesses  in  fact  not  one   meaning  but  a  whole  synthesis  of  "meanings": 
the  previous  history  of  punishment  in  general,  the  history  of  its  employment  for  the  most 
various  purposes,   nally  crystalizes  into  a  kind  of  unity  that  is  hard  to  disentangle,  hard  to 
analyze  …  Today  it  is  impossible  to  say  for  certain  why   people  are  really  punished:   all 
concepts  in  which  an  entire  process  is  semiotically  concentrated  elude  de nition  …  '  
18
The  meaning  of  punishment  is  variable,  accidental,  plural.   It  has  meant  many  very 
di erent  things:   rendering  harmless,  preventing  further  harm,  recompense,  inspiring  fear, 
repayment,  expulsion,  preserving  purity,  a  festival  to  mock  a  defeated  enemy,  and  many 
other  things.     As  Deleuze  puts  it,  the  history  of  anything  is  the  succession  of  forces 
19
which  take  possession  of  it  or  struggle  for  its  possession.   The  same  thing  changes  sense 
depending  upon  the  forces  that  appropriate  it.   There  is  thus  always  a  plurality  of  senses 
to  anything.   
20
      It  would  seem  to  be  clear  from  this  that  history,  for  Nietzsche,  cannot  be  going 
anywhere;  it  certainly  cannot  be  progressing  or  developing  in  a  Hegelian  sense.   There  is 
no  goal  to  history,  nor  even  any  goals  within  history.   There  is  certainly  no  'logic'  to 
history,  nor  necessity.   There  is  not  even  a  single,  coherent  ' ow'  of  history.   It  is  a  random 
series  of  seizures  by  di erent  forces.   Looking  back  on  it,  we  who  study  it  can  dig  up  a 
series  of  layers,  geological  strata,  or,  perhaps  better,  we   nd  a  palimpsest,  one  text  written 
over  another.   There  is  as  much  logic,  connection,  development,  goal-directedness,  or 
necessity  between  di erent  stages  of  history  as  there  is  between  di erent  layers  of  text  in 
a  palimpsest. 
      For  this  reason  we  need  genealogy  rather  than  Hegelian  history.   Genealogy,  as 
Shapiro  puts  it,  has  to  do  'with  the  ascertaining  of  actual  family  lineages  to  determine 
rights  to  titles,  honors,  and  inheritances  …  '     These  lineages  are  not  at  all  necessarily  the 
21
17    GM,   'Second  Essay,'  §  12,  p.  77. 
18    GM,   'Second  Essay,'  §  13,  p.  80. 
19    GM,   'Second  Essay,'  §  13,  pp.  80-1. 
20    Deleuze,  3-4. 
21    G.  Shapiro,  'Translating,  Repeating,  Naming:   Foucault,  Derrida,  and  the 
Genealogy  of  Morals,  '  in  C.  Koelb,  ed.,  Nietzsche  as  Postmodernist   (Albany,  NY:   State 
University  of  New  York  Press  1990),  39. 
 
result  of  steady  Hegelian  growth  like  the  interest  in  a  bank  account,  but  could  well  be  the 
result  of  ruthless  con icts,  reversals,  accidents,  victories,  seizures.   Where  Hegelian 
history  builds  to,  culminates  in,  and  reinforces  the  present,  genealogy,  much  more  so  than 
Hegelian  history,  has  a  powerful  tendency  to  undermine  the  present.   It  can  show  us  that 
things  were  radically  di erent  in  the  past,  that  despite  our  present  condition  our  ancestors 
were  great  and  grand  and  noble--or  it  may  show  us  that  they  were  small,  ugly,  and 
embarrassing.   
      History  is  not,  it  would  seem,  a  slave-like  development,  a  discipline,  a  deepening,  a 
working  toward  some  end.   In  the  Use  and  Abuse  of  History,   Nietzsche  ridicules  Hegel's 
notion  that  we  have  reached  our  zenith  through  world  history,  a  view  'which  turns 
practically  every  moment  into  a  sheer  gaping  at  success,  into  an  idolatry  of  the  actual  …  '
     Nietzsche  rejects  this  conservative  aspect  of  Hegel's  thought.   Nietzsche  wants  to 
22
radically  subvert  the  present.   He  uses  genealogy  to  undermine  the  actual  and  hopefully  to 
go  beyond  it.   For  Nietzsche  we  must  look  selectively  to  the  past  in  order  to  create  the 
future.   But  we  can  understand  the  past  only  'by  what  is  most  powerful  in  the  present.'   
23
Only  by  straining  our  noblest  qualities  to  their  highest  power  can  we   nd  what  is  greatest 
in  the  past.   It  would  seem  that  it  would  take  a  master,  an  Übermensch,   to  interpret  the 
past,  to  grasp  its  greatest  meaning--otherwise  you  draw  it  down  to  your  own  level.   And 
what  this  master  grasps  then  must  be  coined  into  something  never  heard  before  and  used 
to  create  a  new  cultural  vision--to  impose  and  construct  a  future.     This  is  not  the  slave 
24
who  su ers  and  labors.   This  is  the  master  who  names  and  imposes--who  seizes, 
reinterprets,  and  projects  a  new  vision.   It  would  seem  that  Nietzsche  rejects  the  slave  and 
Hegelian  history.   It  would  seem  that  Nietzsche  embraces  the  master  and  genealogy.   And 
it  would  seem  that  the  Übermensch   is  connected  with  the  latter,  not  the  former.   It  would 
seem  so.   That  is  the  reading  of  almost  all  the  commentators.   Nevertheless,  it  is  not, 
 nally,  Nietzsche's  view.   Or  so  I  wish  to  argue  in  what  follows. 
 
II 
Even  in  the   rst  essay,  if  we  look  for  them,  there  are  passages  that  disturb  the  easy  and 
seemingly  obvious  assumption  that  Nietzsche  simply  approves  of  the  masters  and  not  the 
slaves  or  priests.   He  says  that  only  with  the  priestly  form  of  existence  did  'man   rst 
become  an  interesting  animal,   that  only  here  did  the  human  soul  in  a  higher  sense 
acquire  depth   and  become  evil--  and  these  are  the  two  basic  respects  in  which  man  has 
hitherto  been  superior  to  the  other  beasts!'     He  says  that  'history  would  be  altogether  too 
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stupid  a  thing  without  the  spirit  that  the  impotent  have  introduced  into  it  …  '     It  is 
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Nietzsche's  view,  I  think,  that  the  masters  really  are  not  very  bright,  'When  the  noble 
22    T he  Use  and  Abuse  of  History    (hereafter  UAH  ),  A.  Collins,  trans.  (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill  1949),  §  VIII,  pp.  51-2.   See  also  Beyond  Good  and  Evil   (hereafter  BGE  ), 
W.  Kaufmann,  trans.  (New  York:   Vintage  1966),  §  207,  p.  128. 
23    UAH,   §  VI,  p.  40. 
24    Ibid. 
25    GM,   'First  Essay,'  §  6,  p.  33.   Also  The  Will  to  Power   (hereafter  WP  ),  W. 
Kaufmann  and  R.J.  Hollingdale,  trans.  (New  York:   Vintage,  1968),  §  864,  p.  460. 
26    GM,   'First  Essay,'  §  7,  p.  33.   
 
mode  of  valuation  blunders  and  sins  against  reality,  it  does  so  in  respect  to  the  sphere 
with  which  it  is  not   su ciently  familiar,  against  a  real  knowledge  of  which  it  has  indeed 
in exibly  guarded  itself:   in  some  circumstances  it  misunderstands  the  sphere  it  despises, 
that  of  the  common  man,  of  the  lower  orders  …  '     At  any  rate,  it  is  quite  clear  that 
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priests  are  much  more  intelligent  than  the  masters,  'A  race  of  such  men  of  ressentiment   is 
bound  to  become  eventually  cleverer   than  any  noble  race  …  '     This  is  hardly  a   attering 
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picture  of  the  masters  and  it  is  far  from  a  negative  picture  of  the  priests.   The  masters  are 
quite  stupid.   They  are  beasts  not  just  in  the  sense  of  wild  and  vicious   beasts  but  in  the 
sense  of  ignorant   beasts.   With  masters  alone,  without  priests,  humans  would  not  even 
have  risen  above  the  animals.   What  can  we  have  been  doing  when  we  thought  that 
Nietzsche  simply  loved  the  masters  and  was  repelled  by  the  priests?   This  is  just  not  his 
view,  '"The  masters"  have  been  disposed  of;  the  morality  of  the  common  man  has  won. 
One  may  conceive  of  this  victory  as  at  the  same  time  a  blood-poisoning  …  The  progress 
of  this  poison  through  the  entire  body  of  mankind  seems  irresistible  …  To  this  end,  does 
the  church  today  still  have  any  necessary   role  to  play?  …  Which  of  us  would  be  a  free 
spirit  if  the  church  did  not  exist?   It  is  the  church,  and  not  its  poison,  that  repels  us.-- 
Apart  from  the  church,  we,  too,  love  the  poison.--"'     Such  passages,  even  if  they  do  not 
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yet  convince  us,  should  unsettle  us,  should  make  us  very  uneasy  about  the  normal 
interpretation  of  Nietzsche. 
      In  the  second  essay,  Nietzsche  continues  his  genealogy  of  morals,  and  the   rst 
question  he  takes  up  is  how  an  individual  with  the  ability  to  make  promises--how 
responsibility--originally  developed.   This  raises  a  problem  for  Nietzsche  because  he 
believes  that  we  all  have  a  natural  tendency  to  forgetfulness.   It  is  absolutely  essential  to 
forget  if  we  are  to  have  any  peace,  and  thus  be  able  to  act.     If  we  remembered 
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everything,  all  the  in nite  detail  we  are  constantly  bombarded  with,  we  would  be 
overwhelmed;  we  would,  as  he  puts  it  in  the  Use  and  Abuse  of  History,   lose  ourselves  in 
the  'stream  of  becoming.'     Thus,  if  we  are  to  breed  an  individual  with  responsibility,  we 
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must  breed  an  ability  to  overcome  forgetfulness  and  to  keep  promises.   How  was  this 
done?   For  Nietzsche,  it  required  brutal  torture  and  cruel  punishment.   A  memory  had  to 
be  burned   into  the  individual:   'Man  could  never  do  without  blood,  torture,  and  sacri ces 
when  he  felt  the  need  to  create  a  memory  for  himself;  the  most  dreadful  sacri ces  and 
pledges  (sacri ces  of  the   rst-born  among  them),  the  most  repulsive  mutilations 
(castration,  for  example),  the  cruelest  rites  of  all  the  religious  cults  (and  all  religions  are 
at  the  deepest  level  systems  of  cruelties)--all  this  has  its  origin  in  the  instinct  that  realized 
that  pain  is  the  most  powerful  aid  to  mnemonics.'   
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      The  important  question  that  we  must  ask  here  is  who   this  memory  had  to  be  burned 
into?   One's  immediate  impression  after  reading  the   rst  essay  and  from  some  of  the 
language  at  the  beginning  of  the  second  essay,  including  the  passage  just  cited,  is  that 
27    GM,   'First  Essay,'  §  10,  p.  37. 
28    GM,   'First  Essay,'  §  10,  p.  38. 
29    GM,   'First  Essay,'  §  9,  p.  36. 
30    GM,   'Second  Essay,'  §  1,  pp.  57-8. 
31    UAH,   §  I,  p.  6,  see  also  pp.  5-8. 
32    GM,   'Second  Essay,'  §  3,  p.  61. 
 
memory  had  to  be  burned  into  the  slave,  certainly  not  the  master.   This  also  seems  to  be 
the  view  of  Deleuze  and  Danto.     The  notion  of  being  subject  to  punishment  and  torture 
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does  not   t  well  with  our  image  of  a  powerful,  independent,  and  autonomous  master.   It 
would  seem  rather  slave-like.   But  this  is  because  we  have  been  led  astray  in  our 
understanding  of  Nietzsche's  conception  of  masters  and  slaves.   It  is  most  certainly 
Nietzsche's  view  that  memory,  responsibility,  truthfulness  had  to  be  burned  into  the 
masters.   In  describing  the  sovereign  individual,  Nietzsche  clearly  has  the  masters  in 
mind, 
 
This  precisely  is  the  long  story  of  how  responsibility   originated.   The  task  of 
breeding  an  animal  with  the  right  to  make  promises  …  presupposes  …  that  one 
 rst  makes   men  to  a  certain  degree  …  uniform  …   and  consequently  calculable 
…  [T]he  labor  performed  by  man  upon  himself  during  the  greater  part  of  the 
existence  of  the  human  race,  his  entire  prehistoric  labor,   nds  in  this  its  meaning 
…  If  we  place  ourselves  at  the  end  of  this  tremendous  process  …  then  we 
discover  that  the  ripest  fruit  is  the  sovereign  individual  …  the  man  who  has  his 
own  independent,  protracted  will  and  the  right  to  make  promises--  and  in  him  a 
proud  consciousness,  quivering  in  every  muscle,  of  what   has  at   length  been 
achieved  and  become   esh  in  him,  a  consciousness  of  his  own  power  and  freedom 
…  This  emancipated  individual,  with  the  actual  right   to  make  promises,  this 
master  of  a  free   will,  this  sovereign  man--how  should  he  not  be  aware  of  his 
superiority  over  all  those  who  lack  the  right  to  make  promises  and  stand  as  their 
own  guarantors,  of  how  much  trust,  how  much  fear,  how  much  reverence  he 
arouses--he  'deserves'   all  three--and  of  how  this  mastery  over  himself  also 
necessarily  gives  him  mastery  over  circumstances,  over  nature,  and  over  all  more 
short-willed  and  unreliable  creatures?   
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      The  masters  of  the   rst  essay  are  clearly  examples  of  sovereign  individuals.   The 
masters  were  the  truthful  ones,  as  opposed  to  'the  lying   common  man'.     It  is,  then, 
35
especially   the  masters  that  must  have  a  memory  burned  into  them--more  so  than  the 
slaves.   
      What  we  must  see  here  is  that  the  second  essay  does  not  just  continue  on  historically 
from  the  point  reached  at  the  end  of  the   rst  essay.   It  does  not  just  continue  on  discussing 
the  historical  development  of  masters  and  slaves.   Rather,  the  second  essay  digs  deeper 
genealogically;  it  goes  back  in  time  before   the  issues  discussed  in  the   rst  essay.   It  goes 
back  before  masters  existed  and  tries  to  explain  the  origin  of  masters.   And  perhaps  like 
all  genealogy  which  undermines,   the  second  essay  begins  to  undermine  our   rst 
impression  of  the  master,  the  impression  that  we  had  at  the  end  of  the   rst  essay.   At  any 
33    Deleuze,  114-15.   A.C.  Danto,  'Some  Remarks  on  The  Genealogy  of  Morals,  '  in 
R.C.  Solomon  and  K.H.  Higgins,  eds.,  Reading  Nietzsche   (New  York:   Oxford  University 
Press  1988),  17,  26. 
34    GM,   'Second  Essay,'  §  2,  pp.  58-60. 
35    GM,   'First  Essay,'  §  5,  p.  29.   Also  BGE,   §  260,  p.  205. 
 
rate,  these  masters  must  have  a  memory  burned  into  them  through  a  discipline  that  is  very 
much  like  that  of  Hegel's  slave.   
      Moreover,  if  we  begin  to  look  for  it,  we  can   nd  other  evidence,  even  in  the   rst  essay, 
that  the  society  of  the  masters  is  one  that  involves  repression,  discipline,  and  coercion, 
 
the  same  men  who  are  held  so  sternly  in  check  inter  pares   by  custom,  respect, 
usage,  gratitude,  and  even  more  by  mutual  suspicion  and  jealousy,  and  who  on  the 
other  hand  in  their  relations  with  one  another  show  themselves  so  resourceful  in 
consideration,  self-control,  delicacy,  loyalty,  pride,  and  friendship--once  they  go 
outside,  where  the  strange,  the  stranger   is  found,  they  are  not  much  better  than 
uncaged  beasts  of  prey.   They  savor  a  freedom  from  all  social  constraints,  they 
compensate  themselves  in  the  wilderness  for  the  tension  engendered  by  protracted 
con nement  and  enclosure  within  the  peace  of  society,  they  go  back   to  the 
innocent  conscience  of  the  beast  of  prey,  as  triumphant  monsters  who  perhaps 
emerge  from  a  disgusting  procession  of  murder,  arson,  rape,  and  torture, 
exhilarated  and  undisturbed  of  soul,  as  if  it  were  no  more  than  a  students'  prank  … 
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      We  tend  to  remember  the  ugly  brutality  of  the  last  part  of  this  passage  rather  than  the 
emphasis  on  constraint,  repression,  and  self-discipline  of  the   rst  part.   A  good  example 
of  the  masters  would  be  the  ancient  Spartans,  vicious  to  their  enemies,  but  whose  life  at 
home  was  one  of  barracks-room  discipline,  a  discipline  far  more  rigorous  and  di cult 
even  than  the  discipline  they  imposed  upon  their  slaves.   At  any  rate,  the  masters,  as  much 
as,  or  more  than,  the  slaves,  must  develop  the  ability  to  keep  promises,  and  for  this  to 
occur  they  must  go  through  a  discipline  of  torture  and  punishment.   
      Even  further,  there  is  no  way  to  avoid  seeing,  once  we  start  to  look  for  it,  that  for 
Nietzsche  this  slave-like  discipline  produces  spiritual  depth,  sublimation,  creativity,  and 
indeed  that  for  Nietzsche  this  is  the  way  that  we  must  ultimately  come  to  understand 
power.   In  the   rst  essay,  power  often  seemed  to  mean  the  ordinary  power  of  the 
master--military  power,  political  power.   In  the  second  essay  that  is  a  very  secondary  type 
of  power.   It  is  there.   A  memory  is  burned  into  us  through  punishment  and  torture.   It  is 
even  Nietzsche's  view  that  the  state  closes  in  on  us  and  makes  us  direct  our  cruelty  inward 
against  ourselves.      But  what  we  must  see--the  important  point  here--is  that  this  external 
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repression  causes  us  to  develop  a  power  within   ourselves.   It  brings  about  an 
internalization,  a  discipline,  an  empowering--  and  this  is  the  form  of  power  that  Nietzsche 
is  after.   This  is  what  power  primarily  and  ultimately  means  for  him.   We  begin  to  notice  a 
shift  in  this  direction  when  he  tells  us  that  what  is  most  interesting  about  civil  laws  is  not 
that  they  impose  the  will,  say,  of  a  ruler  or  master,  but  that  they  'constitute  a  partial 
restriction  of  the  will  of  life'  which  serves  'as  a  means  of  creating  greater   units  of  power.'
    Repression,  very  much  in  Hegelian  fashion,  produces  a  discipline,  an  overcoming,  the 
38
development  of  greater  power.   Nietzsche  nowhere  sounds  more  like  Hegel  than  in  the 
36    GM,   'First  Essay,'  §  11,  p.  40. 
37    GM,   'Second  Essay,'  §  16,  pp.  84-5. 
38    GM,   'Second  Essay,'  §  11,  p.  76. 
 
following  passage  from  Beyond  Good  and  Evil:    'The  discipline  of  su ering,  of  great 
su ering--do  you  not  know  that  only  this   discipline  has  created  all  enhancements  of  man 
so  far?   That  tension  of  the  soul  in  unhappiness  which  cultivates  its  strength,  its  shudders 
face  to  face  with  great  ruin,  its  inventiveness  and  courage  in  enduring,  persevering, 
interpreting,  and  exploiting  su ering,  and  whatever  has  been  granted  to  it  of  profundity, 
secret,  mask,  spirit,  cunning,  greatness--was  it  not  granted  to  it  through  su ering,  through 
the  discipline  of  great  su ering?'   
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      The  power  Nietzsche  is  after  has  little  to  do  with  the  repression  of  others.   It  has  much 
more  to  do  with  accepting  repression  oneself,  turning  it  into  a  discipline  that  can  produce 
sublimation  and  self-overcoming,  'This  self-overcoming  of  justice:   one  knows  the 
beautiful  name  it  has  given  itself-- mercy;    it  goes  without  saying  that  mercy  remains  the 
privilege  of  the  most  powerful  man,  or  better,  his--beyond  the  law.'     Moreover,  this  sort 
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of  power,  it  becomes  clearer  and  clearer  the  further  we  proceed  in  the  Genealogy  of 
Morals,   has  little  to  do  with  the  master  of  the   rst  essay.   By  the  time  we  reach  the 
beginning  of  the  third  essay  it  has  become  quite  evident  that  the  main  contenders  for  the 
sort  of  power  that  Nietzsche  is  after  are  the  poet,  the  priest,  and  the  philosopher. 
Nietzsche  even  says  that  'a  Homer  would  not  have  created  an  Achilles  nor  a  Goethe  a 
Faust  if  Homer  had  been  an  Achilles  or  Goethe  a  Faust.'     It  is  not  Achilles--a  perfect 
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example  of  the  master  of  the   rst  essay--that  Nietzsche  is  after.   He  is  after  Homer --blind, 
crippled   Homer.   Homer's  accomplishment  is  far  greater  than  Achilles'.   The  best 
example  of  the  sort  of  power  Nietzsche  is  after,  the  best  example  of  the  Übermensch,   I 
want  to  argue,  is  King  Vishvamitra, 
 
As  men  of  frightful  ages,  they  did  this  by  using  frightful  means:   cruelty  toward 
themselves,  inventive  self-castigation--this  was  the  principal  means  these 
power-hungry  hermits  and  innovators  of  ideas  required  to  overcome  the  gods  and 
tradition  in  themselves,  so  as  to  be  able  to  believe   in  their  own  innovations.   I 
recall  the  famous  story  of  King  Vishvamitra,  who  through  millennia  of  self-torture 
acquired  such  a  feeling  of  power  and  self-con dence  that  he  endeavored  to  build  a 
new  heaven--  the  uncanny  symbol  of  the  most  ancient  and  most  recent  experience 
of  philosophers  on  earth:   whoever  has  at  some  time  built  a  'new  heaven'  has 
found  the  power  to  do  so  only  in  his  own  hell.    
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Vishvamitra  is  a  poet,  a  priest,  a  philosopher  who  creates  a  new  heaven,  that  is,  a  new 
religion,  a  new  vision,  new  meaning  and  values.   Why  this  is  so  important  will  have  to  be 
discussed  at  greater  length  below.   At  this  point,  we  must  notice  that  King  Vishvamitra  is 
not  the  master  of  the   rst  essay.   He  is  much  more  like  Hegel's  slave  who  develops 
internally,  who  deepens,  who  becomes  more  spiritual,  who  does  so  through  discipline, 
39    BGE,   §  225,  p.  154.   Also  WP,   §  382,  p.  206. 
40    GM,   'Second  Essay,'  §  10,  p.  73. 
41    GM,   'Third  Essay,'  §  4,  p.  101. 
42    GM,   'Third  Essay,'  §  10,  p.  115.   See  also  The  Gay  Science   (hereafter  GS  ),  W. 
Kaufmann,  trans.  (New  York:   Vintage  1974),  §  338,  p.  269.   Also  WP,   §  1030,  p.  532. 
 
torture,  su ering,  and  who  goes  beyond  the  master,  the  old  order,  by  creating  something 
new,  a  new  religion,  a  new  cultural  vision. 
      But  actually  this  is  not  quite   accurate.   King  Vishvamitra  is  most  interesting  not 
because  he  represents  just  the  slave  principle,  but  because  he  represents  a  linking   of  the 
slave  principle  with  the  master  principle,  and  thus  of  history  with  genealogy. 
      Self-discipline,  self-torture,  going  through  one's  own  hell  is  necessary  to  build  up 
power.   And  power  is  understood  as  the  power  to  create  a  new  vision.   Just  as  for  Hegel, 
the  slave  does  not  confront  the  master  militarily  or  politically.   The  slave  deepens, 
sublimates,  overcomes  by  overthrowing  the  old  gods  and  building  a  new  heaven.   The 
slave  undermines  old  values  and  creates  new  ones.   All  quite  slave-like,  certainly,  but 
nevertheless  we  must  also  see  that  there  is  much  of  the  master  here  also--or  rather  than 
the  actual   master  of  the   rst  essay,  we  must  see  that  what  we  have  is  a  master-principle 
that  applies  more  generally  (even  in  our  world,  even  in  the  future).   Vishvamitra  imposes 
a  new  vision,  revalues  things  radically,  names  them  di erently.   This  Übermensch   says 
'this  is   this  and  this,'  and  'take[s]  possession  of  it.'     This  imposition,  this  creation  of  a 
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new  reality,  clearly  requires  a  master-like  power.   To  impose  a  new  heaven  you  must  have 
the  power  to  do  so--the  power  of  an  Übermensch.    And  at  the  point  where  this  new  vision 
is  expressed  there  occurs  a  historical  break.   The  new  values  imposed  will  be  radically 
di erent  from  the  old--conceptually  and  substantially  di erent.   The  new  meaning  created 
will  not  evolve  out  of  the  old  in  Hegelian  fashion.   The  Übermensch   imposes  a  radically 
new  and  di erent  creative  vision.   It  short-circuits  historical  development.   We  get  a  new 
paradigm.   A  revaluation  of  all  values.   A  new  Weltanschauung .    A  new  force  takes 
possession  of  things  and  wrenches  their  meaning  in  a  new  direction.   
      At  the  same  time,  though,  the  power  to  set  in  motion  this  genealogical  break  was  built 
up  on  the  Hegelian  slave  model.   It  grew  out  of  the  slave  morality  of  the  Jewish  and 
Christian  herd.   And  so,  for  Nietzsche,  I  think  we  must  say  that  whole  stretches  of  history 
operate  on  the  Hegelian  developmental  model  of  discipline,  interiorization,  and 
sublimation.   This  build-up  can  even  last  for  centuries  before  an  Übermensch   comes 
along  with  the  power  to  build  a  new  heaven.   In  fact,  it  would  seem  that  in  large  part  the 
whole  Jewish  and  Christian  era  up  to  the  present,  and  perhaps  also  a  good  part  of  the 
tradition  back  to  Socrates  and  Homer--in  other  words,  most  of  Hegel's  Philosophy  of 
History--  can  be  accepted  roughly  as  it  stands,  except  that,  for  Nietzsche,  it  is  not  headed 
for  the  Absolute,  but  rather  empowers  a  Vishvamitra--or  a  Nietzsche--who  will   nally 
reject  it  all  and  create  a  new  worldview.   Foucault  is  wrong,  then,  when  he  says  that 
Nietzsche  rejects  ideal  continuity  and  teleological  movement.     It  is  true  that  history  as  a 
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whole  is  not  continuous  and  teleological.   Übermenschen   introduce  breaks  into  it.   But 
long  segments  are  continuous  and  teleological.   And  they  are  necessary  to  lead  up  to,  and 
make  possible,  the  Übermenschen   who  introduce  these  breaks. 
      If  we  now  glance  back  at  the   rst  essay,  I  think  we  can  begin  to  see  how  far  we  have 
come  from  the  normal  interpretation  of  the  Genealogy  of  Morals.    If  we  look  back  at  the 
slaves,  the  herd,  the  Jews  of  the   rst  essay,  one  of  the  questions  we  want  to  ask  is  how 
they  di er  from  Vishvamitra--how  they  di er  from  the  Übermensch?     And  don't  we  have 
43    GM,   'First  Essay,'  §  2,  p.  26. 
44    Foucault,  'Nietzsche,  Genealogy,  History,'  154. 
 
to  admit  that  there  is  a  great  deal  of  resemblance  between  the  Jews  and  Vishvamitra? 
Don't  we  have  to  admit  that  it  is  most  di cult  to   nd  any  di erence?   Don't  they  both 
overthrow  the  old  gods  and  build  a  new  heaven?   Don't  they  both  revalue  all  values?   'It 
was  the  Jews  who  …  dared  to  invert  the  aristocratic  value-equation  (good  =  noble  = 
powerful  =  beautiful  =  happy  =  beloved  of  God)  …  saying  "the  wretched  alone  are  the 
good;  the  poor,  impotent,  lowly  alone  are  the  good;  the  su ering,  deprived,  sick,  ugly 
alone  are  pious,  alone  are  blessed  by  God,  blessedness  is  for  them  alone--and  you,  the 
powerful  and  noble,  are  on  the  contrary  the  evil  …  "   In  connection  with  the  tremendous 
and  immeasurably  fateful  initiative  provided  by  the  Jews  …  there  begins  the  slave  revolt 
in  morality:    that  revolt  which  …  we  no  longer  see  because  it--has  been  victorious.'  
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      How  does  this  di er  from  Vishvamitra?   I  think  we  must  just  admit  that  both  slaves 
and  Übermenschen   undergo  discipline  and  torture,  which  deepens  them,  makes  them 
more  spiritual,  which  allows  them  to  overthrow  old  values,  and  which  allows  them  to 
create  a  new  heaven.   One  might  object  that  the  slaves  are  reactive,  and  that  this  is  an 
important  di erence.   But  it  seems  to  me  that  Vishvamitra  reacts  also.   He  reacts  against 
the  old  gods  and  tradition--it  takes  him  a  millennia  of  self-torture  in  his  own  hell  to  build 
up  the  power  to  overthrow  this  old  order.     It  is  not  easy  to   nd  a  meaningful  di erence 
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here. 
      What  de nes  the  Übermensch   for  Nietzsche,  the  test  of  the  Übermensch,   is  the  ability 
to  embrace  eternal  recurrence  and  amor  fati.    I  have  discussed  these  notions  in  detail 
elsewhere.     Here  let  me  just  say  that  Nietzsche's  notion  of  eternal  recurrence  implies 
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that  we  will  have  to  live  through  our  life  over  and  over  again  an  in nite  number  of  times, 
'and  there  will  be  nothing  new  in  it,  but  every  pain  and  every  joy  and  every  thought  and 
sigh  and  everything  unutterably  small  or  great  in  your  life  will  have  to  return  to  you,  all  in 
the  same  succession  and  sequence  …  '     Most  people,  Nietzsche  thinks,  would  be 
48
crushed  by  such  a  notion.   It  would  sap  any  life  of  every  shred  of  meaning,  value,  or 
interest  to  have  to  repeat  it  over  and  over  again.   But  that  is  not  the  view  of  the 
Übermensch.    Übermenschen    love  their  lives,  every  single  detail  of  them.   They  would 
change  nothing.     Whether  eternal  recurrence  and  amor  fati   are  to  be  understood  as 
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doctrinal  truths  or  rather  as  myths,  illusions,  lies,    is  not  very  important.   The  important 
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thing  is  that  the  ability  to  accept  eternal  recurrence  and  amor  fati   implies  an  absolute 
45    GM,   'First  Essay,'  §  7,  p.  34. 
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of  baseness,  meanness,  stupidity;  see  Deleuze,  66.   This  hardly   ts  Vishvamitra. 
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a rmation  of  life,  of  life  as  it  is,  of  one's  own  life  as  an  intrinsic  and  ultimate  value.   The 
Übermensch    nds  meaning  in  life  which  is  not  given  to  it  from  outside,  from  some 
higher  purpose  or  end  which  life  must  serve  and  be  subordinate  to.   To  accept  eternal 
recurrence  and  to  love  one's  fate,  to  love  one's  own  life,  implies  enormous  power  and  an 
enormous  self-con dence  in  that  power.   It  implies  an  ability,  I  suggest,  to  give  your  own 
life  whatever  meaning  it  is  to  have,  to  create  for  yourself  your  own  meaning,  and  to   nd 
that  acceptable,  enough,  the  highest  ful llment.   I  think  that  the  ability  of  the  Übermensch 
to  accept  eternal  recurrence  and  amor  fati   is  tied  to  the  ability  of  the  Übermensch   to 
create  a  new  heaven.  
      We  must  notice  that  before   he  creates  his  new  heaven  Vishvamitra  could  not  embrace 
amor  fati.    At  that  point,  he  would  not  want  all  things  the  same,  unchanged  down  to 
every  little  detail.   That  would  rule  out  the  great  creative  act  he  has  been  disciplining 
himself  for  millennia  to  accomplish.   Only  after  he  creates  a  new  heaven,  or  at  least  after 
he  knows  he  will  be  able  to  do  so,  could  he  be  willing  to  embrace  amor  fati.    It  is  also 
true  that  embracing  amor  fati,   loving  every  detail  of  your  life,  would  rule  out 
ressentiment.    One  cannot  a rm  every  moment  of  one's  life  and  still  feel  ressentiment. 
But  overthrowing  the  old  gods  and  tradition  would  seem  to  require  ressentiment,   or  at 
least  reaction,  or  at  least  desire  for  radical  change.   It  is  only  after  this  great  creative  act 
that  one  can  overcome  the  need  for  change,  reaction,  or  ressentiment  and  embrace  amor 
fati.    So  also,  before  this  creative  act,  Nietzsche  could  not  embrace  the  master  model  of 
history.   Before  your  creation,  you  still  want  to  overcome,  overthrow,  change.   You  want 
the  slave  model  of  history.   You  want  discipline,  interiorization,  sublimation.   You  want  to 
build  up  the  power  to  overcome  the  old  gods  and  create  your  new  vision.   Then,  and  only 
then,  could  you  embrace  the  master  model  of  history. 
      Both  the  Übermensch    and  the  slave  undergo  millennia  of  self-torture.   The  di erence 
between  them  is  that  the  Übermensch   uses  this  to  build  up  the  power  to  create  a  new 
heaven,  whereas  Jewish  and  Christian  slaves,  who  created  their  heaven  a  long  time  ago, 
do  not  want  a  new   heaven  and  so  undergo  their  self-torture,  accept  it,  and  remain  under 
it.   Moreover,  for  the  priest  or  the  slave,  while  su ering  is  necessary,  salvation  will  mean 
the  end   of  su ering.   The  priest  or  the  slave,  at  least  the  Christian  priest  or  slave,  might 
not  wish  to  change  anything  in  their  life-- because   it  culminates  in  salvation.   But  to  have 
to  go  through  that  life  over  again,  let  alone  over  again  an  in nite  number  of  times,  would 
be  horrifying.   For  Nietzsche's  Übermensch,   the  new  heaven  is  not  an  escape  from  the 
su ering  of  this  world.   You  just  see  the  same  world  di erently.   You  interpret  it 
di erently.   You  create  a  new  meaning  so  that  you  accept  the  world  fully.   You  love  it.   It 
is  heaven.   After  all  we  must  remember  that  Nietzsche,  the  man  who  dreamed  up  eternal 
recurrence  and  amor  fati,   himself  led  a  life  of  intense  misery  and  su ering--daily  nausea 
and  incapacitating  migraine  headaches.   Amor  fati   embraces  this,  would  have  it  no  other 
way,  loves  every  detail.   Nietzsche  was  a  slave  to  his  illness.   He  could  do  nothing  about 
it.   Except  that  he  was  able  to  break  its  psychological  stranglehold.   He  was  able  to  turn 
an  '"it  was"  into  a  "thus  I  willed  it."'     He  could  not  eliminate  his  illness,  but  he  could 
51
eliminate  its  power  over  him  by  embracing  it,  willing  it,  deciding  he  wanted  it  no  other 
51    EH,   'Thus  Spoke  Zarathustra,'  §  8,  pp.  308-9.   Z,   Third  Part,  'On  Old  and  New 
Tablets,'  §  3,  p.  198. 
 
way.   He  could  turn  it  into  a  discipline,  so  that  he  could  sublimate,  so  that  he  could  create 
new  meaning.   That  is  the  di erence  between  a  slave  and  an  Übermensch.    At  the  same 
time  here,  we  see  the  deep  link   between  the  slave  and  the  Übermensch--  the  way  the 
latter  develops  out  of  the  former. 
 
III 
To  understand  the  Genealogy  of  Morals   further,  we  must  discuss  the  origin  of  guilt,  the 
development  of  the  ascetic  ideal,  and  Nietzsche's  all  important  notion  of  punishment. 
Punishment  alone,  Nietzsche  thinks,  will  not  produce  guilt.   In  fact,  punishment  tends  to 
harden  the  criminal  and  actually  hinder  the  development  of  guilt.     In  Nietzsche's  view, 
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guilt  arises  as  society  develops,  becomes  peaceful,  closes  in,  encages  the  individual,  and 
prevents  the  outward  discharge  of  instincts:   'All  instincts  that  do  not  discharge 
themselves  outwardly  turn  inward--  this  is  what  I  call  the  internalization   of  man:   thus  it 
was  that  man   rst  developed  what  was  later  called  his  "soul".…  Hostility,  cruelty,  joy  in 
persecuting,  in  attacking,  in  change,  in  destruction--all  this  turned  against  the  possessors 
of  such  instincts  …  '     And  once  guilt,  or  bad  conscience,  develops,  priests  are  quick  to 
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pick  up  on  it,  interpret  it  as  punishment  for  sin,  develop  it,  and  push  it  further  as  an 
ascetic  ideal,    ' the  creature  imprisoned  in  the  "state"  so  as  to  be  tamed,  who  invented  the 
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bad  conscience  in  order  to  hurt  himself  after  the  more  natural   vent  for  this  desire  to  hurt 
had  been  blocked--this  man  of  the  bad  conscience  has  seized  upon  the  presupposition  of 
religion  so  as  to  drive  his  self-torture  to  its  most  gruesome  pitch  of  severity  and  rigor. 
Guilt  before  God:    this  thought  becomes  an  instrument  of  torture  to  him.'   
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      The  state   rst  arises,  Nietzsche  holds,  as  beasts  of  prey  conquer  a  weaker  population. 
These  masters  'do  not  know  what  guilt,  responsibility,  or  consideration  are,  these  born 
organizers  …  It  is  not  in  them   that  the  "bad  conscience"  developed,  that  goes  without 
saying--but  it  would  not  have  developed  without  them   …  '     Again,  we  have  a  Hegelian 
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master-slave  model.   Much  as  for  Hegel,  the  repression  instituted  by  the  masters  forces 
the  slaves  to  internalize,  to  deepen,  and  to  develop  guilt.   And  for  Nietzsche,  '"bad 
conscience"--you  will  have  guessed  it--as  the  womb  of  all  ideal  and  imaginative 
phenomena,  also  brought  to  light  an  abundance  of  strange  new  beauty  and  a rmation, 
and  perhaps  beauty  itself.'     It  is  out  of  this  guilt  and  the  ascetic  ideal  that  develops  from 
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it  that  a  Vishvamitra,  an  Übermensch,   will  gain  the  creative  power  to  overcome,  to 
sublimate,  and  to  create  a  new  heaven.   The  intensi cation  of  guilt  in  the  Christian  ascetic 
ideal  is  a  form  of  self-discipline  and  self-torture  that  takes  an  especially  internalized, 
spiritualized  form  and  thus  especially  contributes  to  imagination  and  creativity.   It  is  also, 
in  Nietzsche's  view,  the  cruelest  and  most  intense  form  of  self-torture  and  thus  may  either 
be  totally  crippling  or  the  greatest  test,  the  greatest  obstacle  to  be  overcome,  and  thus 
capable  of  generating  the  greatest  power--the  power  of  an  Übermensch.   
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      It  is  di cult  to  decide  what  Nietzsche  means  when  he  says  that  the  masters  produce 
guilt  and  responsibility  in  those  they  conquer  but  that  they  themselves  do  not  know  what 
guilt  and  responsibility  are.   It  may  be  that  since  Nietzsche  is  discussing  an  extremely 
early  period--the  very  origin  of  the  state--the  masters  simply  have  not  yet  developed  guilt 
or  responsibility.   The  second  essay,  after  all,  is  trying  to  explain  how  anyone   rst 
develops  these  qualities.   Perhaps  the  masters  will  develop  their  feelings  of  guilt  at  a 
somewhat  later  period.   We  have  already  seen  that  the  masters  do  develop  responsibility. 
They,  especially,  are  the  truthful  ones,  as  opposed  to  the  'lying   common  man.'     Perhaps 
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it  is  the  case  that  masters  only  become  responsible,  but  never  develop  guilt.   Or  perhaps 
they  do  develop  guilt,  but  not  as  intensely  as  priests  or  slaves.   If  they  never  do  develop 
guilt,  or  to  the  extent  that  they  do  not,  then  I  think  we  must  say  that  the  Übermensch   and 
the  master  simply  would  have  no  connection  with  one  another--the  Übermensch   would 
not  develop  out  of  the  master  at  all.   This  is  so  because  it  is  Nietzsche's  view,  I  think,  that 
the  Übermensch   is  not  likely  to  be  able  to  create  a  new  heaven  without  passing  through 
the  intense,  creative  discipline  of  guilt  and  the  ascetic  ideal.   Thus  if  one  tries  to  keep  the 
master  and  the  slave  neatly  separate,  as  the  normal  interpretation  would  have  it,  by 
claiming  that  the  master  does  not  feel  guilt,  then  the  master  would  not  give  rise  to  the 
Übermensch.    The  master  would  repress  the  slave  and  get  the  process  of  internalization 
started,  but,  just  as  for  Hegel,  all  important  development  would  take  place  on  the  side  of 
the  slave  and  the  master  would  simply  be  a  dead  end.   If  one  instead  decides  to  admit  that 
the  master  does  develop  guilt  and  does  undergo  the  ascetic  ideal,  then  one  must  also 
admit  that  there  is  a  de nite  slave-like  side  to  the  master,  a  side  that  we   nd  to  be  deeper 
and  more  signi cant  the  more  we  continue  to  probe  these  issues.   Whichever  way  we  look 
at  it,  we  must  admit  that  the  Hegelian  slave  model   gures  very  centrally  in  the  realization 
of  the  Übermensch. 
      We  must  now  attend  much  more  carefully  to  punishment.   Punishment  is  very  much  a 
key  to  Nietzsche's  thought.   It  is  punishment  which  burns  a  memory  into  individuals  and 
makes  them  responsible,  and  it  is  punishment  within  the  closed  state  which  forces  the 
internalization  that  becomes  guilt  and  the  ascetic  ideal.   Punishment  is  most  central.   And 
on  Nietzsche's  theory  there  must  be  a  great  deal  of  punishment  taking  place--it  would 
seem  to  play  a  central  role  in  the  development  of  all   morality.   It  is  Nietzsche's  view  that 
in  early  history  people  take  a  great  joy  in  in icting  punishment  on  others.   This  is  more 
than  just  a  convenient  assumption  on  his  part  to  explain  the  likelihood  of  su cient 
punishment.   It  gets  us  to  the  strangest  and  most  interesting  dimension  of  Nietzsche's 
thought:   'Today,  when  su ering  is  always  brought  forward  as  the  principal  argument 
against   existence,  as  the  worst  question  mark,  one  does  well  to  recall  the  ages  in  which 
the  opposite  opinion  prevailed  because  men  were  unwilling  to  refrain  from  making   su er 
and  saw  in  it  an  enchantment  of  the   rst  order,  a  genuine  seduction  to   life.'     The 
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question  we  must  ask  is  why  the  in iction  of  su ering  was  so  enjoyable--such  a  seduction 
to  life? 
      I  think  Nietzsche's  answer  is  that  we  live  in  a  terrible  and  alien  cosmos,  a  cosmos  that 
does  not  care  about  human  beings,  where  all  we  can  expect  is  to  su er.   In  the  Birth  of 
58    GM,   'First  Essay,'  §  5,  p.  29. 
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Tragedy,    Nietzsche  recounts  the  wisdom  of  Silenus,  who  when  chased  down  by  King 
Midas  and  asked  what  is  best  for  human  beings,  answered,  'What  is  best  of  all  is  utterly 
beyond  your  reach:   not  to  be  born,  not  to  be,   to  be  nothing.    But  the  second  best  for  you 
is--to  die  soon.'     Why?   Because  the  possibility  of  happiness  is  the  sheerest  of  illusions. 
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Because  human  beings  live  in  a  miserable  world  where  they  are  going  to  su er.   There  is 
no  way  to  avoid  this.   But,  still,  this  is  not  precisely   the  problem.   Human  beings  can  live 
with  su ering.   What  they  cannot  live  with  is  meaningless  su ering--su ering  for  no 
reason  at  all.   Their  problem  is  a  problem  of  meaning.     We  live  in  an  empty  and 
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meaningless  cosmos,  and  we  cannot  face  that.   We  cannot  look  into  reality  without  being 
overcome.   We  need  lies;  we  must  veil  the  horror  of  existence.       We  must  invent 
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meaning.   We  must  give  su ering  a  meaning.   So  what  do  we  do?   The  Greeks  invented 
gods  for  whom  wars  and  other  forms  of  su ering  were  festival  plays  for  their  enjoyment. 
Christians  invent  a  God  for  whom  su ering  is  punishment  for  sin.  
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Apart  from  the  ascetic  ideal,  man,  the  human  animal,   had  no  meaning  so 
far.… This   is  precisely  what  the  ascetic  ideal  means:   that  something  was  lacking, 
that  man  was  surrounded  by  a  fearful  void--  he  did  not  know  how  to  justify,  to 
account  for,  to  a rm  himself;   he  su ered   from  the  problem  of  his  meaning.   He 
also  su ered  otherwise  …  but  his  problem  was  not   su ering  itself,  but  that  there 
was  no  answer  to  the  crying  question,  'why   do  I  su er?'   
      Man,  the  bravest  of  animals  and  the  one  most  accustomed  to  su ering,  does 
not    repudiate  su ering  as  such;  he  desires   it,  he  even  seeks  it  out,  provided  he  is 
shown  a  meaning    for  it,  a  purpose   of  su ering.   The  meaninglessness  of 
su ering,  not   su ering  itself,  was  the  curse  that  lay  over  mankind  so  far-- and  the 
ascetic  ideal  o ered  man  meaning!    It  was  the  only  meaning  o ered  so  far;  any 
meaning  is  better  than  none  at  all  …     
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      And  so  also,  I  suggest,  when  individuals  punish  others,  su ering  is  no  longer 
meaningless--it  participates  in  the  larger  myth  that  has  been  created.   It  is  given  meaning. 
That  is  why  people  of  past  ages  found  it  so  enjoyable  to  in ict  su ering,  not  just  because 
they  were  sadists,  as  Danto  would  seem  to  think,    but  because  in  in icting  su ering  on 
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someone  else  you  unconsciously  participate  in  the  maintenance  of  a  myth.   You  keep 
meaningless  su ering,  the  terror  of  existence,  at  bay.   Unconsciously  you  give 
meaningless  su ering  a  meaning.   It  is  true  that  thereby  su ering  in  the  world  is 
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increased  somewhat,  but  that,  Nietzsche  seems  to  be  suggesting,  is  worth  it  as  the  price  of 
removing  meaningless  su ering  through  participatory  rituals  in  which  you  administer 
su ering  yourself  so  as  to  invest  it  with  the  meaning  it  must  have  for  you. 
      What  we  must  begin  to  see  here  is  that  the  question  of  power,  for  Nietzsche,  is 
connected  with  the  problem  of  meaning.   The  only  kind  of  power  Nietzsche  is  after,  the 
sort  of  power  the  Übermensch   must  have,  is  the  power  to  create  meaning--a  new  heaven, 
a  new  vision,  new  cultural  values.   We  live  in  an  empty,  meaningless  void  and  need  the 
power  to  invent  meaning  in  order  to  be  able  to  live.   Nietzsche  seeks  someone,  as  he  puts 
it,  who  will  redeem  us  from  nihilism  --from  meaninglessness.   This  sort  of  power  has 
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nothing  at  all  to  do  with  the  master  of  the   rst  essay  who  was  a  military  or  political 
 gure.   We  need  a  Homer,  not  an  Achilles.   We  need  an  artist,  a  philosopher,  or  a  priest. 
We  need  a  Vishvamitra.   And  the  sort  of  self-discipline  this  individual  must  go  through, 
we  are  coming  to  see  more  and  more  clearly,  is  spiritual  interiorization,  sublimation,  an 
ascetic  self-denial  that  results  in  the  imaginative  expression  of  a  new  vision,  the  invention 
of  a  new  meaning  to  mask  the  void.   The  ascetic  ideal,  Nietzsche  thinks,  is  the 
precondition  for  this  higher  spirituality:     'This  secret  self-ravishment,  this  artists'  cruelty, 
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this  delight  in  imposing  a  form  upon  oneself  as  a  hard,  recalcitrant,  su ering  material  and 
in  burning  a  will,  a  critique,  a  contradiction,  a  contempt,  a  No  into  it,  this  uncanny, 
dreadfully  joyous  labor  of  a  soul  voluntarily  at  odds  with  itself  that  makes  itself  su er  out 
of  joy  in  making  su er--eventually  this  entire  active   "bad  conscience"--you  will  have 
guessed  it--as  the  womb  of  all  ideal  and  imaginative  phenomena,  also  brought  to  light  an 
abundance  of  strange  new  beauty  and  a rmation,  and  perhaps  beauty  itself  …  '   
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      The  ascetic  ideal,  then,  does  three  things,  two  of  which  we  have  already  discussed  at 
length.   First,  the  ascetic  ideal  creates  meaning  in  our  world,  which  otherwise  would  be  a 
meaningless  void.   It  thus  banishes  senseless,  meaningless  su ering.   It  interprets 
su ering  as  punishment  by  God  for  sin.   Secondly,  the  ascetic  ideal  disciplines  those  who 
live  under  it,  builds  power  in  them,  which  may  make  it  possible  for  a  Vishvamitra  to 
create  a  new  heaven.   This  is  the  Hegelian  slave  model  of  discipline,  interiorization, 
spiritualization,  and  sublimation  which  can  make  possible  the  master  model  of  imposing 
new  meaning.   So  far,  the  ascetic  ideal,  far  from  being  a  denial  of  life,  as  it  may  seem  to 
some,  is  a  powerful  a rmation  of  life.   
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      Thirdly,  and  this  is  something  we  have  not  discussed  at  all  yet,  the  ascetic  ideal, 
because  it  contains  and  has  always  contained  a  powerful  will  to  truth,  begins,  in  the 
modern  era,  to  destroy  the  meaning  and  the  power  it  has  created  over  the  millennia;  it 
begins  to  rip  aside  the  veil  and  to  plunge  us  into  the  void--into  nihilism.   The  ascetic 
ideal,  Nietzsche  thinks,  has  a  rigid  and  unconditional  faith  'in  a  metaphysical   value,  the 
absolute  value  of  truth  …  '     The  ascetic  ideal  denies  itself,  certainly  denies  itself  all 
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falsehood,  illusion,  lies.   Moreover,  in  Nietzsche's  view,  science  is  the  latest  and  noblest 
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form  of  the  ascetic  ideal,    and  certainly  modern  science  has  a  powerful  will  to  truth. 
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This  drive  to  get  at  the  truth  is  a  problem.   It  is  a  problem  because  reality  is  terrible. 
Truth  is  horrible.   We  live  in  an  empty  and  meaningless  cosmos  where  we  can  only  expect 
to  su er.   We  cannot  live  without  myths  and  illusions.   We  have  always  needed  an 
Übermensch,   someone  powerful  enough  to  impose  these  myths.   And  now  the  will  to 
truth  characteristic  of  the  ascetic  ideal  is  ripping  aside  the  veil,  leading  us  to  the  last  thing 
we  want--true  reality.   We  are  about  to  fall  into  the  abyss--plunge  into  nihilism.   We  will 
perish  if  that  occurs.   We  need  a  Vishvamitra,  an  Übermensch,   to  create  a  new  heaven. 
Even  the  Übermensch    needs  such  illusion.   No  more  than  anyone  else  can  the 
Übermensch   live  in  the  void. 
      Thus,  the  ascetic  ideal,  for  a  couple  of  millennia,  has  given  us  meaning  in  a 
meaningless  cosmos.   It  is  now  undermining  that  meaning  through  its  will  to  truth.   But  it 
also  disciplines  us,  builds  power  in  us,  that  may  make  it  possible  to  create  a  new  heaven. 
 
IV 
At  this  point,  it  has  to  be  clear  to  us  that  masters  and  slaves  are  not  two  neat  and  separate 
classes.   The  master  of  the   rst  essay  is  not  someone  Nietzsche  does  anything  so  simple 
as  just  identify  with.   He  plays  with  the  concept  of  the  master--experiments  with  it.   He 
uses  it  to  dislodge  and  reveal.   He  uses  it  to  undermine  the  morality  of  the  present.   He 
shows  us  the  genealogy  of  this  morality--which  embarrassingly  leads  us  back  to  the 
opposite  of  what  presently  exists.   When  Nietzsche  succeeds  in  relaxing  our  grip  on  the 
morality  of  the  present,  the  master  is  tossed  aside,  and  the  master-principle   begins  to 
shift,  evolve,  and  become  much  more  subtle: 
 
master  morality   and  slave  morality--  I  add  immediately  that  in  all  the  higher  and 
more  mixed  cultures  there  also  appear  attempts  at  mediation  between  these  two 
moralities,  and  yet  more  often  the  interpenetration  and  mutual  misunderstanding 
of  both,  and  at  times  they  occur  directly  alongside  each  other--even  in  the  same 
human  being,  within  a  single   soul.   
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consider  how  regularly  and  universally  the  ascetic  priest  appears  in  almost  every 
age;  he  belongs  to  no  one  race;  he  prospers  everywhere;  he  emerges  from  every 
class  of  society.…--it  must  indeed  be  in  the  interest  of  life  itself   that  such  a 
self-contradictory  type  does  not  die  out.   
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Here  we  have  di erent  tendencies,  di erent  attitudes  within  the  same  person--not 
di erent  classes  of  people.   Furthermore,  back  in  the   rst  essay,  if  we  now  read  even  more 
carefully  than  before,  Nietzsche  makes  it  quite  clear  that  priests--while  they  are  the 
opposite  of  the  masters  and  are  aligned  with  the  slaves--nevertheless,  are  themselves 
aristocrats,  nobles,  masters.     And  Nietzsche  speaks  of  'how  easily  the  priestly  mode  of 
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valuation  can  branch  o   from  the  knightly-aristocratic  and  then  develop  into  its  opposite; 
this  is  particularly  likely  when  the  priestly  caste  and  the  warrior  caste  are  in  jealous 
opposition  …  '     Priests  and  masters  are  two  parts  of  the  same  class.   Priests  are  masters. 
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Even  Zarathustra  tells  us  that  his  blood  is  related  to  that  of  priests  'and  I  want  to  know 
that  my  blood  is  honored  even  in  theirs."'    
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      If  we  admit  that  the  priest  is  a  type  of  master,  then  the  next  step  is  to  notice  that  for 
Nietzsche  the  'Jews  …  were  the  priestly  nation  …  par  excellence  …  '     It  follows,  then, 
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that  Jews  are  a  type  of  master.   And  there  is  good  reason  to  think  that  Nietzsche  accepts 
this  view.   In  the  Jews,  he  says,  'there  dwelt  an  unequalled  popular-moral  genius:   one 
only  has  to  compare  similarly  gifted  nations--the  Chinese  or  the  Germans,  for 
instance--with  the  Jews,  to  sense  which  is  of  the   rst  and  which  of  the   fth  rank.'  
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Clearly  the  Germans  are  of  the   fth,  and  the  Jews  of  the   rst,  rank.   In  Beyond  Good  and 
Evil,   Nietzsche  says:   'The  Jews,  however,  are  beyond  any  doubt  the  strongest,  toughest, 
and  purest  race  now  living  in  Europe;  they  know  how  to  prevail  even  under  the  worst 
conditions  (even  better  than  under  favorable  conditions)  …  That  the  Jews,  if  they  wanted 
it--or  if  they  were  forced  into  it,  which  seems  to  be  what  the  anti-Semites  want-- could 
even  now  have  preponderance,  indeed  quite  literally  mastery  over  Europe,  that  is  certain; 
that  they  are  not   working  and  planning  for  that  is  equally  certain.'     What  we  must 
79
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think  them  inferior,  etc.   But  Nietzsche  is  often  guilty  of  what  might  be  called  positive 
racism.   He  is  all  too  willing  to  generalize  about  races  or  nations,  to  assign  them  a 
character,  a  uni ed  identity,  perhaps  even  an  essence.   In  doing  so,  he  often  points  to  what 
he  takes  to  be  the  strengths  of  a  people.   But  to  ignore  variation  between  individuals,  to 
rank  a  people  against  other  peoples,  to  lump  them  together  and  to  generalize  in  this  way, 
only  di ers  from  ordinary  racism  in  that  it  approves  of  this  people  rather  than  disapproves 
and  demeans. 
Schutte  has  suggested  that  Nietzsche  scholars  tend  to  cover  up  for  Nietzsche--they 
tend  to  avoid  criticizing  many  of  his  values.   She  argues  that  we  ought  to  be  much  more 
critical  of  him.   I  agree  with  this.   I  think  many  of  Nietzsche's  views,  especially  those 
centering  around  his  elitism,  are  morally  atrocious.   But  I  think  our  criticism  must  be 
carefully  timed.   We  must  restrain  our  criticism  until  we  understand  Nietzsche.   Schutte 
goes  on  to  say  that  'Nietzsche  repeatedly  justi ed  slavery  and  the  exploitation  of  the 
disadvantaged  for  the  sake  of  the  development  of  a  "higher  culture  …  "'  (Schutte,  162). 
This,  I  have  tried  to  argue  in  this  paper,  is  to  misunderstand  and  to  oversimplify  the 
relation  of  master  to  slave  as  Nietzsche  understands  it.   The  Übermensch   is  as  much  a 
slave  as  a  master  and  the  role  of  the  slave  in  producing  a  higher  culture  is  much  more 
subtle  and  complex  than  Schutte's  complaint  suggests.  
 
 nally  accept  is  that  'master'  and  'slave'  refer  to  qualities,  characteristics,  tendencies  that 
can  be  found  in  any  society,  class,  or  person. 
      So  instead  of  asking  whether  Nietzsche  endorses  or  approves  of  the  master  or  the 
slave,  we  should  ask  which  model  of  history  Nietzsche  uses,  that  of  the  Hegelian  slave  or 
that  of  the  master  and  genealogy?   Which  will  explain  the  possibility  of  the  Übermensch? 
Which  will  explain  the  possibility  of  Europe's  move  to  and  beyond  nihilism?   As  I  have 
tried  to  argue  in  this  paper,  it  is  de nitely  not  simply  the  master  model  that  can  be  used  to 
do  these  things.   It  requires  a  complex  mix  of  both   models.   
 
  
